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Recognizing that defaults and foreclosures take a toll on the economic welfare of communities and the nation as a whole, many analysts have called for the write-down of principal on mortgage debt as the most effective solution to the problem of underwater mortgages. As these analysts attest, write-downs have the important advantage of raising value.
However, the difficulty lies in carrying out the write-downs. While principal reduction on mortgages held in bank portfolios occurs at significant and still growing rates, loans held in private-label securitization (PLS) trusts have certain structural features that make such reductions very rare. Specifically, these loans are subject to pooling and servicing agreements that would require collective action by a large majority of security holders before the loans could be modified or sold out of trusts. Conducting such a collective action across most holders of the securitized loans would be nearly impossible.
This edition of Current Issues puts forward a strategy for carrying out the write-downs. Essentially, it recommends that state and municipal governments use their eminent domain powers to address the collective action problems that now prevent the write-down of privately securitized loans. Under eminent domain, these governments can step in to purchase underwater loans at fair value, deal directly with the trustees of the private-label securitization trusts, and sidestep the rigidities of the pooling and servicing agreements. They can then reduce the principal on these loans, lowering the "water" and thereby reducing the risk of default.
The Mortgage Debt Overhang: Scope of the Problem Fewer than half of the nation's roughly 11 million under water mortgages are current, and large numbers of these mortgages go delinquent each month: 2 Together with loans that are already delinquent or in default, 7.5 to 9.5 million additional homes are expected to go into liquidation over the next several years absent remedial action. 3 These liquidations would further burden an already depressed market, yielding a backlog of vacant homes equal to 200 percent of U.S. annual home sales at the current sales pace (Olick 2012; Ritholtz 2012; .
For communities, the fallout from these developments is substantial, with residents forced to give up their homes and property tax bases weakened-ironically, just as abatement costs wrought by abandoned properties rise . Other homeowners lose neighbors and endure the blight and lost value associated with boarded-up neighboring homes. Over time, they may see city services cut, school districts retrenching, and local economies shrinking-an aggregate monetized loss now estimated at $2 trillion Shoen 2012 ). Though causality is doubtless complex, the fact that so many counties have been filing for bankruptcy of late seems unsurprising against this backdrop (Church et al. 2012 ).
The mortgage debt overhang undermines the health of the national economy as well. Defaults and foreclosures in the housing markets feed back into the macroeconomy through effects upon net worth and spending (Federal Reserve Board 2012; Dudley 2012) . And as reduced spending lowers growth and employment, more mortgages are drawn into foreclosure (Federal Reserve Board 2012; Dudley 2012; Hockett , 2012b . Hence the familiar "holding pattern" of high underwater loan and foreclosure rates yielding low growth and employment, which in turn yield yet more default and foreclosure, and so on (Hockett , 2012b (Hockett , 2013 . 4 
The Prudent Solution: Scaled Principal Write-Downs
The most effective means of averting mortgage delinquency, default, and foreclosure-and the associated economic costs-is principal reduction. As even creditors recognize, 2 See Olick 2012, , Ritholtz 2012 Ritholtz 2012; Goodman 2012. 4 Of course not all mortgage troubles are attributable to declining home values. Some homeowners face difficulty keeping current on payments for reasons of temporary unemployment in a slack economy. For this class of mortgagor, several colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and I have designed a Home Mortgage Bridge Loan Assistance Program, informed by a successful Pennsylvania program developed during the early 1980s steel slump (Orr et al. 2011) . A draft bill to institute the program, which two of us coauthored, is under consideration in New York Hockett 2012a, 2012c) . But even assuming success here and in other states, the nation' s larger mortgage debt overhang problem will remain unaddressed Hockett 2012a, 2012b ). Scale debt loss must be formally recognized in a manner that bears some intelligible relation to home equity loss. Moreover, for much underwater mortgage debt, write-downs raise value-a benefit borne out by the frequency with which portfolio loan holders write down debt (Olick 2012; Ritholtz 2012; ).
Write-downs are not easily carried out in all cases, however. Much depends on whether the targeted loans are held in bank portfolios or by private-label securitization trusts. In the portfolio case, write-downs occur at significant and still growing rates Streitfeld 2011) . Bank officers know that underwater loans foreclose at high rates, with the result that expected values fall needlessly short of face values; hence, they find it financially rational to write down these loans. In so doing, they benefit not only themselves, but also their debtors and the communities in which they reside. In this case, the interests of all parties converge.
Securitized mortgage loans, however, pose a problem. While it would be no less rational or beneficial to write these loans down, certain structural features of the loans-features that now act as market failures-prevent the rational thing from being done. The upshot is deadweight loss-loss whose recoupment and equitable distribution is one object of the plan sketched below.
Structural Impediments to Write-Downs
What are these structural impediments? A host of classic collective action problems, reinforced by dysfunctional contract provisions, stand in the way of the optimal solution (Hockett , 2012b Shiller 2012) . For one thing, there is a last-mover advantage where write-downs are concerned, owing to the benefits (positive externalities) that accrue to the creditors on later loans when principal is reduced on earlier loans. This problem afflicts portfolio loans too, of course, and probably therefore keeps modification rates lower than optimal even among banks. But in the case of privately securitized loans, it is reinforced by additional challenges.
Most decisive among the additional challenges is that so many of the pooling and servicing agreements governing the private securitization of loans-agreements drafted during the bubble years when few foresaw a marketwide housing price bust, and many rushed either to push or to purchase an innovative product-require supermajority voting among mortgage-backed securities (MBS) holders before loans can be modified or sold out of trusts. And these bondholders, geographically dispersed and unknown to one another, cannot collectively bargain with borrowers or buyers on workouts or prices.
Moreover, the agreements governing the loans prevent trustees and loan servicers, who are duty-bound to act on behalf of the bondholders and thus could in theory address their collective action problems, from modifying or selling off loans in the requisite numbers (Hockett , 2012b . 5 Finally, the agreements typically stipulate compensation arrangements that make it more profitable for servicers to oversee lengthy foreclosure proceedings than to seek modification. In sum, then, these contracts now virtually ensure that mortgage loans will default, harming all interested parties.
Additional complications arise from the fact that many underwater homes are subject to second liens that secure home equity lines of credit or closed-end second mortgages. First lienholders benefit little from loan modifications unless second lienholders modify too; hence, they are rationally reluctant to modify on their own. But second lienholders feel less pressure to modify because borrowers, strapped by post-bust liquidity needs for which home equity lines constitute precious sources of credit, are apt to make payments on them first-a reversal of the legal order of creditor priorities . 6 In addition, the second lienholders quite often are banks-the same banks that service the first-lien-secured loans. That poses a conflict of interest where firsts prefer that seconds modify too in order to optimize the benefits that modification brings to firsts, further obstructing agreement among borrowers and creditors.
Other constraints-including inapplicable bankruptcy laws and Internal Revenue Code and Trust Indenture Act uncertainties-impede the kind of collective action that would benefit both debtors and creditors (Hockett , 2012b . But the foregoing discussion suffices to indicate how formidable the obstacles to principal write-downs can be, particularly for loans held in private-label securitization trusts.
Bypassing the Impediments through Collective Agency
Solving a collective action problem requires a collective agent. Of course, that is what PLS trustees and servicers in theory are. But as we have seen, these agents are often hand-tied or conflicted. Who, then, will act for the creditors and, in so doing, for homeowners and spillover victims of local foreclosure and the continuing weakness in the U.S. mortgage market?
As it happens, governments are also collective agents. They are likewise the sole entities authorized to sidestep the contract rigidities of the pooling and servicing agreements that stand in the way of broad write-downs for PLS loans. But which government should take up this mantle-federal, state, or local?
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In 2008-09, this author and two others separately advocated federal action under eminent domain-the power of governments to take private property for public use (Hockett 2009; Jackson 2008; Willis 2008) . In 2010, two higher-profile advocates, including one member of Congress, added their names to the call (Miller 2010; Kuttner 2010) . But thus far no action of this sort has been taken, even though other actions have brought some help.
The federal government's flagship Home Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP), for example, has accomplished much, but it is not designed to deal with underwater or "negative equity" mortgages. For their part, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been steered clear of write-downs by their regulator and current conservator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (Appelbaum 2012) . Finally, Congress has twice now attempted but failed to get mortgaged homes into the Bankruptcy Code, thus leaving no means for bankruptcy judges to employ their equitable powers to salvage value among mortgagors and mortgagees as they routinely do among other debtors and creditors. 7
The consequences of our failure thus far to focus on principal reduction can be seen in more numbers: Since 2007, little more than 1 percent of underwater home loans have seen write-downs. Fewer than half of these write-downs have brought loans above water. Meanwhile, only 2.7 million loans have been modified in any way by their servicers, while 40 percent of these modifications have reduced monthly payments by less than 10 percent. 8
This weak response is surprising in light of the abundant evidence, derived from the portfolio loan case, that sizable write-downs save sizable value (Olick 2012; Ritholtz 2012; . And it is surprising too given the compelling evidence, found in the GSEs' filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, that unmodified underwater PLS loans will default at high rates: For 2006 vintage loans, for example, 71 percent of subprimes, 70 percent of option adjustable-rate mortgages, 58 percent of variablerate loans, and a surprising 40 percent of traditional fixed-rate loans have defaulted. 9
The State/Municipal Eminent Domain Plan
If it is not to be federal instrumentalities or PLS trustees and servicers, then, the collective agents best able to address the structural problems that arise with the pooling and servicing agreements on privately securitized loans are state and municipal governments. These governments (a) face the brunt of mass foreclosure and its consequences more directly than the federal government in any event, and (b) have constitutional authority to address these exigencies. 10 Let us first consider how the subfederal units of government can act, then elaborate briefly on their suitability for these roles.
Using their traditional eminent domain powers-a legal authority enshrined in our state and federal constitutions for precisely such exigencies as the foreclosure crisis presents-states or their sub-units can compulsorily purchase underwater loans from private-label securitization trusts at fair value, dealing directly with trustees and sidestepping all contract rigidities. They can then write down the loans, reducing default risk and raising expected values in the process.
If need be, eminent domain authority can also be used to take second-lien-secured loans at fair value, or even the liens that secure them, while leaving the notes with their holders-effectively converting the latter to unsecured consumer debt. That prospect can bring recalcitrant second lienholders to the table with firsts-particularly if, as suggested below, they also are offered some fraction of the surplus recouped through the write-downs.
Financing the Refinancing: Federal Money, Private Money, or Both
But how are states or their sub-units to pay for the loans or the liens, given that the foreclosure crisis has left them more cash-strapped than the federal government? Here is how: One possibility is to finance the purchases with monies lent by federal agencies in the manner of the Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief and Public-Private Investment Programs, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's MBS stabilization programs, all of which ultimately have turned profits. Alternatively, they might use monies provided by private investors, or monies from both federal agencies and private sources. The federal agencies or private investors then can be paid from the proceeds of the refinanced and accordingly more valuable loans, or in bonds issued against pools of the same.
If private money is used, then the investors both can and ought to include current bondholders, who might receive warrants before federal or private investors are brought in. This approach respects bondholder interests and underscores the sense in which the eminent domain plan is meant simply to solve a collective action problem that dysfunctional pooling and servicing agreements prevent trustees and servicers from solving themselves on behalf of their bondholder beneficiaries.
By working with states or municipalities in this manner, current bondholders would piggyback on governmental authority to sidestep the contracts that currently preclude their doing what portfolio lenders already do. To note that these participating bondholders will be "paying themselves" less than face value would just be a roundabout way of saying that they are writing down principal.
The diagram above presents a schematic rendering of the eminent domain plan. The diagram, which should be read counterclockwise, shows investors, including current bondholders and perhaps federal agencies, conveying funds to eminent domain trusts operated by the states or their subunits. These eminent domain trusts then purchase deeply underwater ("bad") loans from private-label securitization trusts. The states or their sub-units, in most cases probably advised or otherwise assisted by financial professionals, then work with homeowners to write new mortgages, replacing the negative equity loans with modestly positive equity loans-probably thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages in all cases. 11 Finally, the new ("good") loans are conveyed to the first-mentioned trusts, which convey the resultant funds to the first-mentioned investors.
The payouts will in most cases take the form that payouts on the earlier, unmodified loans took-bond yields to bondholders. And, as noted earlier, the new bondholders should include as many of the original bondholders as wish to participate, since 11 Freeing the loans from their PLS trusts, it bears noting, renders them amenable to the Federal Housing Administration Short Refinance, Hardest Hit Funds, and HAMP Principal Reduction Alternative programs. the aim of the plan is to enable homeowners and bondholders to do what the pooling and servicing agreements now prevent them from doing-modifying underwater loans to recoup presently lost value.
The sequence of steps depicted in the diagram provides only the broad outline of the plan. More is required to render any particular variation operational. There are, for example, the matters of (a) selecting and valuing appropriate loans; (b) securing government and/or private investors, if any; (c) commencing the legal proceedings necessary to exercise eminent domain authority; (d) modifying and possibly re-securitizing the loans once purchased; (e) working with homeowners throughout the foregoing; and (f) compensating investors at appropriate stages.
All of these actions can be managed in various ways . Briefly, on (a), the guiding criterion should be whether the loans' expected value can be raised sufficiently to offset the write-downs and associated transaction costs. A variation on this criterion, where public money is available to supplement private money, might be to include loans whose expected-value improvements fall slightly short of offsetting the write-downs and associated transaction costs, in light of the foreclosure externalities that write-downs will avoid.
On (b), if federal and subfederal units of government find merit in the plan, they can approach one another to arrange lending from the former to the latter. Either can also approach existing bondholders or other investors if desired.
On (c), states or their sub-units will commence the proceedings and courts will conduct them. In the "quick take" proceedings available in most states, the taking authority places the estimated value of the loans plus some margin in escrow when filing, explains the basis of its valuations to the court's satisfaction, then takes title. Subsequent litigation, if any, concerns only whether more should be paid, not whether the taking can proceed. In most cases, governments have accurately assessed the value of the loan, often with assistance from private valuation experts, and paid adequately. This bears noting in view of popular misconceptions concerning the likelihood of protracted litigation.
It should also be noted that, in view of the market failure and consequent waste stories that prompt this proposal, we can anticipate sizable pre-trial, out-of-court agreements among state or municipal governments and bondholders on loan selection and valuation criteria, particularly if relevant federal officials facilitate.
As for (d), (e), and (f), these are primarily matters for states or municipalities to manage, albeit again with assistance from public or private financial professionals in most cases. The municipalities are best situated to approach 
Basic Structure of the Eminent Domain Plan
Notes: The double-headed arrow represents class overlap rather than a flow. The two vertical arrows crossing the dotted line represent a detour between the "bad loan" and "good loan" arrows. MBS is mortgage-backed securities; PLS is private-label securitization.
prospective homeowner beneficiaries once qualifying loans are identified. Financial advisory assistance, in turnwhether from a federal entity like the Federal Housing Administration, from private providers, or both-will be helpful in most cases both in restructuring loans and in arranging investor compensation.
The Plan's Legal Basis: Taking Intangibles for Public Purpose and Paying Fair Value
How commonly is eminent domain used for more than compulsory land purchases for roads and bridges? Though non-lawyers are not always aware of the fact, governmental authorities compulsorily purchase property at fair value for public use all the time (Hockett 2012a, Section IV). And they do so with all manner of property-tangible and intangible, contractual and realty-related alike.
Forms of intangible property that have been purchased in eminent domain include bond tax exemption covenants, insurance policies, corporate equities, other contract rights, businesses as going concerns, and even sports franchises . Because the law draws no distinctions between kinds of property that can be purchased in eminent domain, it is unsurprising that loans and liens in particular, as one form of contractual obligation among many, are themselves regularly purchased. 12 Among these are mortgage loans and liens, as the Supreme Court and state courts have long recognized. 13 The question, then, is not what kinds of property can be taken, but whether a public purpose justifies the taking and fair value is paid. Preventing more foreclosures, blighted properties, revenue base losses, and city service cutbacks is recognized by courts as the most compelling of public purposes justifying use of the eminent domain authority. 14 As for fair value, how is this determined? Won't municipalities have to purchase loans at less than fair value to recoup enough margin to compensate the investors, public or private, who put up the purchase money? First, on valuation, there are multiple methods available. Where mortgage-backed securities associated with a particular loan pool or analogous pools trade at a discount, for example, imputation of counterpart discounts to underlying loans is arithmetically straightforward. And private-label securitization bonds, it bears noting, are trading at very steep discounts. The latest data from Amherst Securities on PLS senior debt, for example, are telling, as are estimates of senior bonds as percentages of total bonds outstanding and prices thereof as percentages of unpaid principal balances (see table above).
Where bond-to-loan discount-imputation is unavailable owing to missing markets, discounted cashflow methods will do. As noted above, for example, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac publish expected default rates for sundry classes of underwater PLS mortgages each year. From these-along with foreclosure costs, associated recovery rates (generally no more than 22 percent on defaulted loans), and discount rates-the calculation of net present values is not a recondite exercise. And our courts, which routinely hear valuation arguments in multiple contexts and often impanel experts, will oversee the proceedings as required by law, ensuring fairness to parties. Even this safeguard might be more than is necessary, however, if federally overseen valuation summits of the kind mentioned above and discussed further below should prove workable.
What about the putative need to pay current investors less than fair value to compensate new ones? Must one rob Peter to pay Paul? The answer is no. Eminent domain proceedings need not represent "zero sum games." By averting market failures-and the needless sacrifice of value that these failures entail-the plan proposed here recoups value, which can then be equitably distributed to render all stakeholders better off. the value recouped by the write-downs, since in foreclosure they receive nothing.
Why the National Problem Is First a Local Problem
It was suggested earlier that state and local governments might be better situated than the federal government to take the lead in pursuing a plan like that sketched in this article-even if federal instrumentalities might play helpful supporting roles. Why is this the case? In what sense do localities face the worst of the mortgage debt overhang problem, and thus have incentive to act first?
The answer is that even though the problem is ultimately national in scope, its worst symptoms are locally concentrated. In some communities, more than 80 percent of PLS loans are underwater. The degree to which the loans are underwater, moreover, can be dramatic: some communities' underwater PLS loans have average loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater than 200 percent, and many more have ratios approaching that number. The map above affords a telling, if understated, 15 picture of how localized the worst of the nation's underwater mortgage problems actually are. 16 
Concerns Raised by the Eminent Domain Plan
While it is not possible here to anticipate and fully address all concerns that the eminent domain plan might invite, one can cover the most obvious ones in broad outline. These fall under two headings-concerns of the sort that debt write-downs seem always to raise, and concerns relating to the reliance on state rather than federal authority to implement the plan. 15 The chart covers all underwater loans, and does not distinguish high-LTV loans from lower-LTV loans. 
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Debates over the justice and efficiency of debt forgiveness are long-standing. Critics say that contracts are binding commitments that must be upheld, while proponents of debt forgiveness say some debts are "odious. " Again, critics say that write-downs induce moral hazard and reduce credit availability, while proponents observe that you cannot squeeze blood from turnips. We are not going to settle such perennial questions here, any more than the Book of Leviticus or centuries of "law versus equity" have done. But three things bear noting.
First, owing to asset-price bubbles' status as collective action problems, it is doubtful that many homebuyers during the bubble years had much choice when it came to buying overvalued homes. That most homes were overvalued is what rendered the bubble a bubble. It therefore seems mistaken to blame homeowners as a class, or to characterize writedowns as per se unfair or morally hazardous. It is also easy to formulate loan-selection criteria in ways that do not encourage "strategic" defaults going forward-by reference to LTV/default correlations as suggested above (Hockett , 2013 (Hockett , 2010 .
Second, for similar reasons, there seems little need to fear long-term contraction in liquidity or credit. Bubbles inflate only when credit is overabundant. We want, then, some credit-caution in future, just not too much. And we want to get to that middle ground as quickly as possible. The best way to do this is first to clear out the overhang under which 11 million homeowners still struggle, then to ensure that the pooling and servicing agreements for residential mortgage-backed securities going forward look more like the agreements for commercial mortgage-backed securities always have looked-providing in advance for value-salvaging modifications on a scale unanticipated before the most recent crisis, and thereby preempting the future need to resort to such methods as the one proposed here. 17 New residential mortgage securitizations suggest that the latter change is already under way. To resolve what earlier securitizations have wrought, however, requires a plan like that outlined above.
Finally, it is important to recall that write-downs are done on nonmortgage debt all the time. We call it bankruptcy, and afford it to firms because it salvages value. The plan proposed here does the same. And as noted above, the value thus saved can be shared among all stakeholder classes.
Turning now to issues linked to the plan's reliance on state, rather than federal, authority, we find some concerns stemming from possible differential application of the eminent domain plan across states and localities. Florida counties, for example, might construct variants of the plan that differ from those adopted by Louisiana parishes. California or Michigan plans might diverge from both. Would such differences raise fairness concerns?
The question is a complex one. We should certainly welcome some degree of national uniformity (this is one reason the present author [2009] first proposed federal, not state or local, action in 2008). But local conditions do vary from county to county, such that fairness itself dictates some variation. It is also the case that our federal system already involves quite significant state variation with respect to all manner of law-from property, tort, and even commercial law to electoral law. There will be nothing particularly unusual, then, in differing states' crafting differing variants of the plan here proposed. It might even be welcome-for the usual "laboratories of democracy" reasons given for local experimentation.
All of that said, however, federal agencies could be helpful in confining local variation within reasonable bounds, as well as in promoting efficient and amicable loan workouts nationwide along lines like those here proposed. By bringing municipal or state, homeowner, bondholder, and bank representatives together under one "summit" structure, the Treasury, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Federal Reserve Board or regional banks like the Federal Reserve Bank of New York operating thereunder, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, or some combination thereof could facilitate consensus among all concerned parties on the basic contours that all local variants of the eminent domain plan should take. There is no reason this consensus could not include loan-selection and loan-valuation principles as well as more detailed practical elements.
Conclusion: It Takes a Village-but a Federal Government Helps
The guiding ideal in any such summit as that proposed here should be to convert the eminent domain tool into a mere formality enabling all interested parties to sidestep dys functional pooling and servicing agreements consensually and thereby recapture lost value. Getting past these contracts and the collective action problems they underwrite is, after all, precisely and solely what this plan is for. States and their sub-units are best situated at this point to act. But federal agencies could be helpful facilitators for all.
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Securitization and the Fixed-Rate Mortgage Andreas Fuster and James Vickery
Payment Size, Negative Equity, and Mortgage Default
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Payment Changes and Default
Help for Unemployed Borrowers: Lessons from the Pennsylvania Homeowners' Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program James Orr, John Sporn, Joseph Tracy, and Junfeng Huang Current Issues in Economics and Finance, vol. 17, no. 2, April 2011 In an environment of high foreclosure rates and distressed housing markets, federal policies are focusing on loan modifications to help delinquent homeowners pay their mortgages. While it is too soon to assess the effectiveness of these modifications, policymakers considering future refinements may gain insight from a more established, statelevel enterprise that takes an alternative approach to mortgage relief. The Pennsylvania Homeowners' Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program provides temporary income support to homeowners unable to pay their mortgage during a spell of unemployment. The program has helped most participants retain their homes while paying off their loans-at a potentially lower cost than that of other relief initiatives.
A Private Lender Cooperative Model for Residential Mortgage Finance
Toni Dechario, Patricia Mosser, Joseph Tracy, James Vickery, and Joshua Wright Staff Reports, no. 466, August 2010 This paper describes a set of six design principles for the reorganization of the U.S. housing finance system and applies them to one model for replacing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that has so far received frequent mention but little sustained analysis-the lender cooperative utility. The authors discuss the pros and cons of such a model and propose a method for organizing participation in a mutual loss pool and an explicit, priced government insurance mechanism. They also discuss how these principles and this model are consistent with preserving the "to-be-announced, " or TBA, marketparticularly if the fixed-rate mortgage remains a focus of public policy. Mortgage modifications have become an important component of public interventions designed to reduce foreclosures. This study examines how the structure of a mortgage modification affects the likelihood of the modified mortgage re-defaulting over the next year. Using data on subprime modifications that precede the government's Home Affordable Modification Program, the authors focus attention on those modifications in which the borrower was seriously delinquent and the monthly payment was reduced as part of the modification. The average re-default rate over the twelve months following the modification was 56 percent. The data indicate that the re-default rate declines with the magnitude of the reduction in the monthly payment, but also that the re-default rate declines relatively more when the payment reduction is achieved through principal forgiveness as opposed to lower interest rates.
